Abstract. In a simple exchange economy we propose a bargaining procedure that leads to a Walrasian outcome as the agents become increasingly patient. The competitive outcome therefore obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. Our bargaining procedure involves bargaining over prices and maximum quantity constraints, and it guarantees convergence to a Walrasian outcome for any standard exchange economy. In contrast, without quantity constraints we show that equilibrium is generically inefficient.
Introduction
Price-taking behavior is typically invoked as a necessary requirement to obtain the competitive outcome. In this paper, we propose a bargaining foundation for the Walrasian equilibrium in a small exchange economy where agents are not pricetakers. The bargaining procedure we analyze relates to those studied in Binmore (1987) and Yildiz (2003) . More specifically, in our set-up each agent alternatingly offers a price and a maximum amount to be exchanged, and the respondent either accepts and chooses the quantities to be traded at the terms of the offer, or rejects and makes an offer in the next period in which utilities are discounted. We show in this set-up that the competitive outcome obtains when bargaining frictions vanish, even without price-taking behavior. This convergence result holds for any standard exchange economy. Moreover, the outcome does not depend on details such as relative impatience and bargaining power or outside options. Paradoxically, by explicitly introducing price-setting as a strategic variable in an otherwise standard bargaining environment, the competitive outcome is restored. Price-taking is therefore not a necessary requirement for attaining a perfectly competitive outcome.
The main implication of the convergence result is that, as discounting frictions vanish, the bargaining outcome does not depend on the exact specification of time preferences. Instead, the bargaining outcome converges to a Walrasian allocation which is determined by the preferences and endowments of the agents. It seems natural after all that the bargaining outcome is not exclusively determined by relative patience (or by exogenous bargaining power in axiomatic Nash bargaining) as is, on the contrary, the case in the alternating-offer bargaining of Rubinstein (1982) or Ståhl (1972) . There, the outcome depends on the relative impatience of the bargaining parties, with the relatively patient agent obtaining a proportionally larger share of the surplus. 1 Rather, in many economic environments the bargaining outcome may depend, at least in part, on preferences and endowments, for example on the degree of substitutability between the goods consumed.
The bargaining procedure with price offers that guarantees our convergence results necessarily involves maximum trade constraints. This indicates that the details of the bargaining procedure are important (see also Binmore (1987) ). We show that the conditions for convergence obtained in Yildiz (2003) for a bargaining procedure over prices without maximum trade constraints are too strong in the sense that almost no economy satisfies the assumptions made in Yildiz (2003) . For any economy of an open and dense subset of the set of standard exchange economies there will exist at least one equilibrium of the bargaining game without quantity constraints that converges to an inefficient allocation. The importance of maximum trade constraints is first established by Binmore (1987) in the context of axiomatic bargaining. He is the first in the modern bargaining literature to connect the competitive equilibrium to bargaining outcomes in two person economies. He presents 1 With discounting, the offering agent can extract some rents from the recipient because a counteroffer cannot be made until one period later. Smith and Stacchetti (2003) refer to this as a temporal monopoly by the offering agent. Even in the case when both agents become infinitely patient, the rate at which they do so will determine the final outcome. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) (see also Binmore (1987) ) establishes that the alternating-offers bargaining solution approaches the Nash bargaining solution with utilities that reflect the incentives to settle and with the disagreement point properly chosen. a modified Nash demand game with minimum prices and maximum quantity constraints and shows that the (large) set of Nash equilibria of this game includes the Walrasian allocation.
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In the next section, we lay out the model. In section 3, we present the main result of convergence to the Walrasian allocation. We obtain first the result for equilibria in which there is immediate acceptance by showing in Theorem 1 that, without discounting, every Stationary Subgame Perfect (SSP) equilibrium allocation is Walrasian and conversely. The convergence result in Theorem 2 follows then from the upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence. In section 4 we study other equilibria. We establish first that SSP equilibria with delay do not exist, from which the convergence result in Theorem 3 for every SSP equilibrium follows. We study then non-stationary Subgame Perfect equilibria. Whenever there is a unique Walrasian allocation, Theorem 4 establishes that any non-stationary SP equilibrium converges to the Walrasian allocation. In Section 5 we consider the same bargaining procedure but without maximum trade constraints, as in Yildiz (2003) . In this case, Theorem 5 shows the generic existence of asymptotically inefficient SSP equilibria, and Theorem 6 shows the impossibility of a unique SSP equilibrium converging to a Walrasian outcome. Section 6 provides a discussion with some examples: of inefficiency even in the limit of SSP equilibria if no maximum trade constraints are imposed, and of non-convergence in the absence of differentiability. Section 7 finishes with some concluding remarks. Proofs and some Propositions and Lemmas are relegated to the Appendix.
The model
Consider an exchange economy with two agents A and B, each with endowments e In general, for given endowments, the allocation is not Pareto efficient and therefore there exist gains from trade. The central issue in this paper is to address the question of how those gains from trade are realized. More specifically, we are interested in establishing whether all gains from trade are completely achieved (i.e. whether the outcome is efficient) and if so, which of all efficient allocations is obtained.
Since the price-taking assumption is not easily justified in a two-person economy, we propose a bargaining procedure in which agents set prices that allow them to realize completely the gains from trade. More specifically, we consider an alternatingoffers bargaining game in which, in any given period, one of the agents offers to the other a vector of relative prices at which he is willing to trade up to some maximum amount (the maximum trade constraint henceforth). Thus an offer by say A consists of a vector of prices p A (in terms of good 1) and a quantity constraint q A . Without loss of generality, we assume the quantity constraint is on the amount traded of good 1. Upon the reception of an offer, the recipient, i.e. B in this case, can either accept the offer or reject it. If she accepts, she then chooses her most preferred consumptionx In effect, from subgame perfection, once B decides to accept A's offer, she will choose the consumption bundlex It turns out to be the case that there is no loss of generality in focusing on the SSP equilibria with immediate acceptance. In effect, we focus first in Section 3 on equilibria with immediate acceptance, and then we show in Section 4 that there are no SSP equilibria with delay whenever the agents are impatient.
The convergence result
In this section, we develop the argument that establishes the convergence to a Walrasian allocation of every SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance of the bargaining over prices and maximum trades. The key insight of the argument is realizing that in exchanging price and quantity offers, the agents are actually bargaining over some allocations. In effect, given the subgame perfection of the equilibrium, any agent making an offer anticipates the optimal acceptance behavior by the recipient, and therefore an offer (p 
Condition (3) characterizes the set of solutions to maximization problems of the class (1) above.
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It holds with equality if the maximum trade constraint does not effectively constrain B's choice and with strict inequality otherwise. A similar condition holds for offers made by B that might be accepted by A at a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance.
As a consequence a SSP equilibrium with immediate acceptance of the alternatingoffers bargaining over prices and maximum trades can be characterized by two feasible allocations (x 
given (x 
Delay and Non-stationary Strategies
Are there SSP equilibria with delay? Although in general bargaining environments with complete information, equilibria with delay in reaching an agreement may exist (for an exhaustive treatment, see Merlo and Wilson (1996) , and also Sákovics (1993) ), in the bargaining procedure considered here there is no SSP equilibrium with delay when the agents are impatient. In order to see this, we first extend the definition of a SSP equilibrium in (1) and (2) to allow for a delay in the acceptance of an offer. Without loss of generality, and in line with the argument above, we define the equilibrium in terms of the allocations 
and therefore makes his most preferred offer acceptable to
4 Proposition 1 in the appendix provides a sufficient condition for the nonempty-valuedness of the correspondence that is satisfied by a large class of utility functions that includes, among others, all the CES utility functions. Moreover, the condition is not necessary so that the nonemptyvaluedness holds for an even wider set of preferences.
and is accordingly making an unacceptable offer to B, i.e. Consider now a candidate SSP equilibrium in which say B rejects and A accepts. In such equilibrium A prefers to make an offer that is rejected by B, and hence that gives A a smaller utility u
Also A prefers to accept B's offer because it gives A a higher utility u Thus since there is no SSP equilibria with delay, it trivially follows that all SSP equilibria converge to the Walrasian allocation, as stated in Theorem 3 below, which summarizes the main result of the paper. Key to this result is that the constraints on the offers made is a maximum trade constraint. When the bargaining procedure is modified to allow for minimum quantity constraints, SSP equilibria with delay do exist (see Dávila and Eeckhout (2002) ). Maximum constraints not only seem more natural, they in addition provide a starker prediction, i.e. convergence to the Walrasian allocation, compared to minimum constraints.
Non-stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria. So far, we have restricted attention to stationary strategies, therefore ruling out the use of non-stationary threats. Merlo and Wilson (1995) show that such non-stationary strategies can lead to a continuum of subgame perfect (SP) equilibria. In the light of such indeterminacy, stationarity is often invoked as a natural selection criterion because it acts as focal point within the set of SP equilibria, or because it requires a minimal number of states for automata to implement a SP equilibrium.
Nonetheless, for economies in which the Walrasian allocation is unique, it follows from Theorems 1 through 3 that every SSP equilibrium allocation converges to the unique Walrasian allocation. Theorem 4 below then follows from this convergence result and the results in Merlo and Wilson (1995) . The proof is provided in the appendix. 
Bargaining Over Prices Only
As the agents exchange price offers in the bargaining protocol considered above, the maximum trades they expressed in their offers are essential for the convergence result to obtain. In effect, if the agents bargain over prices only (as in Yildiz (2003) ), then generically there exist SSP equilibria whose payoffs to the agents remain bounded away from the Pareto frontier, even in the limit as their discount factors δ A and δ B converge to 1. This bargaining model is essentially a special case of the one analyzed above. Acceptance is as before, and an offer now consists of a price p, which is a special case of a price offer with a maximum trade constraint where the trade constraint is slack. As a result, the model satisfies the equations above but without the quantity constraint ever binding.
The existence of an inefficient SSP equilibrium can be discerned by looking at how the SSP equilibrium payoffs behave in the space of utilities as δ Note first that at a SSP equilibrium necessarily the only constrains the agents face making their offers (namely, the acceptability of their offers) must be binding, i.e.
6 We are grateful to Antonio Merlo for pointing us to their result in Merlo and Wilson (1995) . 7 The analysis in Yildiz (2003) is developed entirely in the space of utilities as well. As a matter of fact, even the assumptions in Yildiz (2003) are assumptions made directly on derived concepts in this space, such as the "offer curves" in the space of utilities, instead of being made on the fundamentals of the economy. Unfortunately, it turns out that the assumptions in Yildiz (2003) made this way are actually satisfied jointly only by a degenerate set of economies. Our analysis above has been made instead working in the space of allocations and taking into account explicitly the fundamentals of the economy in order to avoid this problem.
Equivalently, the payoffs of a SSP equilibrium of the bargaining over prices only must be intersections in the space of utilities of two curves f 
These curves are, for discount factors δ 
The typical pattern of f

A
, for instance, is that as A's utility increases when we move away from the endowments point along A's offer curve, B's utility initially increases too, but eventually decreases. ) has another important property, illustrated in Figure 1 and stated in Lemma 1 below, that plays a crucial role in showing the existence of SSP equilibria of the alternatingoffers bargaining over prices only that remain inefficient even in the limit. The proof is provided in the appendix. As a matter of fact, the existence of asymptotically inefficient SSP equilibria of the alternating-offers bargaining over prices is a generic property of these economies. Theorem 5 below establishes this and its proof is provided in the appendix. Moreover none of the two cases (1) and (2) is degenerate.
Discussion
In this section, we provide first some intuition for the conjecture that, not only every SSP equilibrium outcome converges to a Walrasian outcome as stated in Theorem 3, but also every Walrasian outcome is reachable as a SSP equilibrium outcome as δ A , δ B → 1. Then we provide some examples illustrating the need for some of the assumptions in order to obtain the results. The first example illustrates the necessity of the maximum trade constraints. Without maximum quantity constraints, we produce a robust SSP equilibrium that converges to an inefficient allocation. We then provide an example with non-differentiable utility functions where bargaining with quantity constraints does not necessary imply convergence to the Walrasian equilibrium, which stresses the importance of the differentiability conditions. 14 An even number of them to be precise. 15 Note that, in the case of, for instance,f A 1 whenever A's desired trade at some prices p B by B is smaller than B's desired trade at those same prices, there is no way in which B can obtain a bigger trade than that resulting from A's demand at the prices p B . Hence the utilities inf 
Is every Walrasian allocation reachable as a SSP equilibrium allocation as δ
In the case δ
A )) must be in the vertically and horizontally shaded area in Figure 2 that is the intersection off 
and the complementary bundles for agent B. In this economy, the relevant part of A's offer curve coincides with the contract curve, which is the diagonal of the Edgeworth box. When making an offer, A can impose a maximum constraint on B and therefore any offer that would induce B to consume more than the Walrasian equilibrium amount of good 2 will lead to an offer accepted on the contract curve. Therefore, offers accepted by B exactly coincide with offers accepted by A. The thick line segment on the diagonal in Figure  4 represents those coinciding allocations. In the space of utilities in Figure 5 below, this translates into a continuum of undominated intersections of the boundaries off 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a simple bargaining procedure that achieves the competitive equilibrium allocation without assuming price-taking behavior. The procedure is commonly observed, in the sense that negotiating parties often bargain over a price with a quantity constraint, and then the quantity of trade is chosen separately. An interesting property of the main result of this paper is that, by always obtaining the Walrasian equilibrium, the outcome of the bargaining does not depend on specifics such as relative bargaining powers or impatience, but only on primitives, i.e. preferences and endowments.
In the context of the Nash demand game, Binmore (1987) stresses the importance of quantity constraints. Bargaining procedures with maximum quantity constraints capture the main aspects of several existing price setting mechanisms. For example, in commodity futures markets, the seller of future contracts will typically announce to a candidate buyer the price for the contract and how many contracts he has on offer. The candidate buyer can accept the price offer and choose the number of future contracts as long as it does not exceed the quantity constraint that was offered initially. The same is true for limit orders when selling stock. Your limit order guarantees a certain price for the stock, but you cannot be sure that the order 14 will be filled. Only if there is sufficient demand at that price will your order be filled (either partially or completely). In addition, our bargaining procedure involves separation of the price-setting by the proposer from the quantity decision by the recipient. This price-quantity separation is obviously well known in negotiations and has common applications in several economic environments such as union-wage bargaining in the labor economics literature,
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and standard buy-out provisions in two-person partnerships.
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Finally, Gale (1986) (see also Kunimoto and Serrano (2004) ) establishes a bargaining foundation for the Walrasian equilibrium outcome in general exchange economies with a continuum of traders and random pairwise matching. In his paper, the possibility of being matched later on to another agent offering better terms drives the convergence to the competitive outcome. That argument does not apply in a small economy like ours. Therefore, our results contribute to extending a bargaining foundation for Walrasian equilibrium to economies with a small number of agents. Despite the (only two) agents being price-setters, the perfectly competitive outcome still obtains. We conjecture that our results extend to the case of an arbitrarily finite number of agents. In the extreme case in which the number of agents increases to a continuum and pairs are formed through random matching, then the bargaining procedure proposed in Gale (1986) leads to the Walrasian equilibrium outcome.
Conversely, assume x ∈ R n ++ satisfies (16) . Assume, after relabelling if necessary, that x 1 = e 1 . Then (17) above as well as the constrains of (15) . This first order conditions are sufficient for x to solve (15) given the assumptions on u. Q.E.D. on the same indifference surface for both agents but none of them is efficient, in particular, for some i, j 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (x
.
(25) Since (23) implies that the numerator is positive, the denominator is strictly positive as well, which amounts to 
Γ(δ
where
and 
, and 
is upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. Assume that Γ is not upper hemicontinuous at some y. Then there exist {y n } → y, x and {x n } → x such that x n ∈ Γ(y n ) for all n ∈ N, while x / ∈ Γ(y). That is to say, for all n ∈ N, x n ∈ Φ(x n , y n ) while x / ∈ Φ(x, y). As a consequence, since Φ is compact-valued, then Φ is not upper hemicontinuous at (x, y)! Q.E.D. 24 In the sense that,
does not change sign. This guarantees that the offer curve (or surface in general) does not ever change curvature (i.e. has no inflexion points) and hence the constrained domain delimited by the offer curve is convex. This condition is satisfied whenever the substitution effect dominates largely the wealth effect, and in particular by every CES utility function. (2) and 
alternating-offers bargaining over prices and maximum trades, for any δ
A , δ B ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. A SSP equilibrium is characterized by two allocations, (x
and also B's offer is his most preferred acceptable to A, i.e.
, which guarantees A's acceptance, and (2) A's offer is rational, that is to say A is interested in B's rejection since A obtains more utility from B's offer one period later, i.e.
and accordingly makes an unacceptable offer to B, i.e. 
i.e. the second constraint in (43) 
and therefore there is room for A deviating making an offer that is Pareto improving with respect to x B and that B would accept.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4. Theorem 8 in Merlo and Wilson (1995) establishes that the extreme payoffs of the set of Subgame Perfect equilibria are stationary, and that all Subgame Perfect equilibria are contained within those extreme SSP payoffs.
Since there is a unique Walrasian equilibrium and every SSP equilibrium converges to it, these extreme payoffs (and hence every SP equilibrium payoffs) converge to the Walrasian payoffs. The strict convexity of the preferences implies that the convergence takes place also in allocations and prices. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Letx be an allocation on A's offer curve close to the Walrasian allocation x * . Letx be the allocation distinct fromx giving A and B the same utilities asx. Thenx andx are characterized by the equations (in terms of A's consumptions) u
for some relative price p, where φ In effect, the function that determinesx 
the first two columns are linearly independent, even at the Walrasian equilibrium allocation x * ,
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and hence
As for Dξ
), note that, altough the Jacobian of the left-hand side of the first two equations in (47)
drops rank at the Walrasian allocation x * , the first two equations in (47) still definê x A as a function ofx A since, for strictly convex preferences and any given pointx, there exists a uniquex where the two indifference curves throughx cross each other again (ifx happens to be efficient, thenx actually coincides withx). This function is not only differentiable off the contract curve (where the Jacobian is full rank and the implicit function theorem does apply), but also at x * since, asx departs slightly from an efficient allocation x * on the contract curve, the lens formed by the two indifference curves going throughx cross again (almost) at a pointx across the contract curve in the direction of the line supporting x * as a Walrasian equilibrium (see Figure 7) . The linear mapping approximating this function is
27 This is a consequence of the strictly differentiably quasi-concavity of u A .
for some c * > 0 that depends on the curvature of A's and B's indifference curves at x * .
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Therefore, since
If, as shown in Figure 6 , the slope of the path followed byx is at x * smaller than the slope of B's offer curve, then around the Walrasian allocation, for any given level of utility u Figure 1 . And conversely if, on the contrary, the path followed byx had at x * a slope bigger than B's offer curve. Only in the case in which the path followed byx had at x * a slope equal to that of B's offer curve, i.e. only if at the boundaries implies that at one of those efficient intersections these curves must cross, which by Lemma 1 above happens only for the complement 28 In words, Dξ A (x A * ) consists of the composition of (i) a change to an orthogonal basis containing the price vector (p * , 1), (ii) a jump across the first axis of that basis, and (iii) the undoing of the change of basis.
29 The perturbation need not always be made in the space of utility functions. For instance, in the case of the symmetric Cobb-Douglas example we provide in Section 6 this condition is satisfied only for initial endowments on the anti-diagonal of the Edgeworth box, i.e. in a closed and nowhere dense subset of endowments space for the given Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
30 Note that in the equation (53) appear equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. This may deserve a comment. In general, an equation to be fulfilled by equilibrium values needs not impose any constraint on the primitives of the economy, as for instance is the case for the Walras Law (as a condition on the primitives, the Walras Law happens to be an identity, and is hence satisfied whichever the primitives are). Notwithstanding, any equation in the equilibrium values of an economy actually is a condition on the primitives of the economy that needs not be an identity on the primitives either. In our particular case, equation (53) ), and hence they will be negative also. But from (52) in Lemma 1,
(see Figure 9 , for the case c * = 1 and 1 < p * 2 , in the proof of Theorem 5 below).
whenever the profile of offer curves slopes
is close to the graph of g, which is satisfied by a nonempty open set of economies. Q.E.D. The pointwise convergence of {x n } tox guarantees the pointwise convergence within a compact of the associated offer curves
. Also the (piecewise)
31 Remember that the negative slope at (
) amounts to the non-existence of an allocation on the offer curve of either agent that Pareto-improves uponx andx. Should any of the curves of profiles of utilities be upward-sloped, then a mutually beneficial counter-offer could be made to the agent whose curve of profiles of utilities along his offer curve is upward-sloped.
32 Not depicted in Figure 7 for the sake of readability. (1+c * )p * always, the asymptotes of g * (and hence g * itself) intersect every region a i in Figure 8 , except for a 5 , a 6 see footnote 33 about these excluded cases.
1−c
−p
35 That is to say, in a 5 , a 6 , for i = A, B, it holds dx i 1 dp > 0 and dx i 2 dp −1 > 0 simultaneously for some range of prices. We think of this case in which demand increases for the good that is becoming more expensive and decreases for the good that is becoming cheaper as a non-observed pathological case. Note that this does not prevent backward-bending offer curves, and hence that any good may be inferior for some range of prices. It just excludes the possibility of both goods being inferior for the same range of prices.
Far enough in the sequence {x n }, A's marginal rate of substitution at the intersection ofx n with B's offer curve is close to p * , and hence not bigger than the slope of B's offer curve at x * . By continuity, the same is true for δ 
